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Injuries caused by workplace activities that involve repetitive motion, known as 
musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs), increasingly concern workers, employers, and 
regulators because of their frequency and high treatment costs. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) recently proposed a national rule designed to reduce 
the workplace risk of MSDs. OSHA estimates there were about 626,000 MSDs in 1997, 
representing about one-third of all serious nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses. 
OSHA estimates the proposed rule will cost $4 billion per year and generate $9 billion 
per year in benefits. Yet, OSHA does not provide sufficient evidence that private markets 
are failing to reduce MSD risk without government intervention and does not 
convincingly demonstrate that the rule will result in more good than harm.  
Unless OSHA effectively addresses some of the more serious flaws in the 
proposed rule, OSHA should not proceed with the final regulation. OSHA should more 
carefully evaluate the nature and extent of MSDs in the workplace than it did in the 
proposed rule and use improved economic analysis to target serious MSDs that 
employers can reduce at low cost. Furthermore, OSHA should include new provisions to 
improve employer access to information about reducing workplace risk of MSDs. The 
rule’s ergonomics program requirements should apply only to those MSDs which 
employers do not have sufficient incentive to reduce without government intervention.  
Recommendations 
 
The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) should redesign its 
proposed ergonomics rule: first, OSHA should more precisely evaluate the nature and 
extent of musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) in the workplace than it did in the proposed 
rule; second, OSHA should use improved economic analysis to target serious MSDs that 
employers can reduce at low cost; third, OSHA should include new provisions to 
improve employer access to information about reducing workplace risk of MSDs. The 
rule’s ergonomics program requirements should apply only to those MSDs that 
employers do not have sufficient incentive to reduce without government intervention.  
 
1.  Precisely Evaluate the Nature and Extent of MSDs in the Workplace. OSHA 
cannot target serious MSDs without good information about the nature and extent of 
MSDs in the workplace. A more precise evaluation of workplace MSDs than OSHA 
provided in the proposed rule will help OSHA target severe and well- understood 
MSDs that employers can reduce at low cost, termed “target MSDs.”  
 
a.  Refine the Estimate of Workplace MSDs. OSHA’s estimate of workplace 
MSDs may include injuries that are not MSDs. OSHA should provide support for 
each type of injury included in the final estimate of workplace MSDs. All of the 
injuries in the category “sprains, strains, and tears” from “overexertion,” may be 
MSDs, for example, but OSHA did not demonstrate that these injuries are all 
caused by repetitive motion over time. OSHA should also discuss whether all low 
back injuries included in the estimate, which account for 55% of all MSDs, are 
caused by repetitive motion. OSHA should adjust the workplace MSD estimate if 
injuries that are not MSDs are included in the estimate. 
 
b.  Provide Data on MSD Trends. The rule does not provide any information on 
trends in the frequency and severity of specific MSDs over time, so it is not clear 
the rule targets these injuries. To evaluate the frequency and severity of MSDs 
over time, OSHA should analyze the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data from 
1992 to the present by injury, duration of injury, job type, and industry.  
 
c.  Estimate the Effects of Multiple Risk Factors on the MSD Estimate. Some 
MSDs are clearly the result of a particular work activity, and others are the result 
of multiple risk factors. OSHA should adjust the workplace MSD estimate to 
account for multiple risk factors, such as non-work activities or the physical 
ability of a worker to tolerate repetitive stress. Ergonomics scholars use an 
“aetilogical fraction” in their analyses of the number of workplace injuries, which 
is the proportion of injuries among workers exposed to the risk of injury that is 
attributable to the exposure. OSHA should use different aetilogical fractions for 
different injuries and job types, as appropriate. 
 
d.  Classify Causal Relationship Studies by Injury and Job Type. According to 
the proposed rule, enough evidence exists to suggest there is a strong causal 
relationship between workplace activities and MSDs. According to the National 
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Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, however, the nature and strength of 
such evidence varies significantly among injuries. OSHA should classify the 
causation evidence presented in the rule by MSD and job type, and discuss the 
association between workplace activities and specific MSDs. OSHA also should 
show, if possible, that the causes of specific MSDs in different job categories 
covered by the rule are well enough understood that it is feasible to design 
effective ergonomics programs.  
 
2.  Use Economic Analysis to Identify Target MSDs. Reducing the risk of target 
MSDs will, by definition, have high benefits and low costs. To identify target MSDs, 
OSHA should combine information on the nature and extent of workplace MSDs 
discussed in the previous section with information about the cost of interventions. 
OSHA then can estimate the aggregate costs and benefits of the rule. As a result of 
flaws in OSHA’s economic analysis of the proposed rule, OSHA overestimated the 
benefits of the proposed ergonomics rule. The following recommendations, which 
address the flaws in OSHA’s economic analysis, will help OSHA estimate the costs 
and benefits of reducing target MSDs.  
 
a.  Base Analytical Assumptions on Peer-Reviewed Studies. The economic 
analysis relies on assumptions based in part on studies not published in peer-
reviewed journals. Where possible, OSHA should use peer-reviewed studies. 
OSHA should weigh the results of peer-reviewed studies more heavily than 
other studies, such as reports from company ergonomics program managers 
that estimate the average effectiveness of workplace interventions. 
 
b.  Discuss the Uncertainty in Key Assumptions. Despite the widely accepted 
difficulty of identifying and understanding workplace MSDs, the economic 
analysis relies on a number of assumptions that are point estimates. It also 
does not include a test of the sensitivity of its final estimates to these key 
assumptions. OSHA should identify probability distributions where possible. 
OSHA should conduct extensive sensitivity analysis. OSHA should, for 
example, use the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health’s 
estimate of the decline in MSDs resulting from a 50% reduction in workplace 
risk to estimate the benefits of the rule, in addition to its estimate of a 100% 
reduction in workplace risk. 
 
c.  Adjust Baseline to Reflect Decline in MSDs Over Time. OSHA assumed 
that the number of workplace MSDs would remain at 1996 levels for the next 
ten years. MSDs have declined every year since 1992. OSHA should adjust its 
baseline to reflect this decline, which will lower both the benefits and the 
costs of the regulation.  
 
d.  Include Failed Ergonomics Programs in Effectiveness Estimate. OSHA’s 
assumption that ergonomics programs will reduce injuries by 50% is based on 
a review of successful programs, and does not include programs that failed to 
reduce risk. OSHA should revise the average effectiveness estimate to include 
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some failed programs, and provide information about failed programs to 
company managers to discourage investment in ergonomic programs with 
negligible benefits. 
 
e.  Link Cost and Benefit Estimates. OSHA’s cost estimate is based on a 
different set of studies than its benefit estimate. As a result, OSHA’s benefit 
estimate relies on employers implementing ergonomics programs that are 
potentially more costly than the programs on which the cost estimate relies. 
The same is true of the effectiveness of ergonomics programs; the programs 
used to estimate the costs of the rule may be less effective than the programs 
used to estimate the benefits of the rule. OSHA should use the same 
ergonomics programs to estimate the costs and the benefits of the rule. 
 
3.  Improve Employer Access to Information about Reducing Workplace Risk. 
The market has already shown that it will respond to better information about the 
risk of MSDs, as indicated by the 5% annual decline in MSDs since 1992. If the 
employer savings from ergonomics programs that OSHA cites in the proposed 
rule exist, such as increased worker productivity and worker compensation 
savings, improving access to useful information about the rewards of such 
programs should encourage employers to adopt them.  
 
a. Provide On-line Information. While information about ergonomics 
programs is available in the literature, there is no central, reliable on-line 
source of information about ergonomics programs. OSHA should provide on-
line information to employers about risk, intervention costs, intervention 
effectiveness, and the causes of specific MSDs, including an assessment of the 
quality of the research findings. OSHA should rely primarily on peer-
reviewed studies. OSHA further should design a web site that is easy to search 
by industry, job type, or injury, and provide additional information to 
industries with the highest MSD incidence rates. 
 
b.  Fill Key Information Gaps. There is a dearth of studies that synthesize 
existing information about MSDs, such as the study by the National Institute 
for Occupational Safety and Health that summarizes epidemiologic evidence 
for MSDs from over 600 studies. OSHA could commission reports to help 
employers identify the ergonomics programs that are most likely to reduce 
risk from workplace activities. OSHA should also evaluate the quality of any 
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I. Introduction  
 
There is increasing concern about injuries caused by workplace activities that 
involve repetitive motion, known as musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs).
1 The nature of 
these injuries varies widely, as do the associated workplace activities. One worker, for 
example, might injure his back after years of lifting doors on an assembly line while 
another might injure her wrist after years of typing on a keyboard. In response to growing 
concerns about such injuries, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) proposed a national rule designed to reduce workplace risk of MSDs in 
November 1999.
2 The rule requires workplaces that record at least one MSD in a given 
year to implement an ongoing program to reduce the risk of injury.  
OSHA estimates that there were about 626,000 MSDs that required injured 
employees to miss at least one day of work in 1997, down from 784,000 in 1992. These 
MSDs represent approximately 34% of all nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses.
3,4 
OSHA’s rule requires companies to implement risk reduction programs based on 
ergonomics, or “the applied science of equipment design intended to maximize 
productivity by reducing operator fatigue and discomfort.”
5 The so-called ergonomics 
rule does not apply to all workplaces, but it covers 342 industries, almost six million 
establishments, and 31 million employees in manufacturing jobs, manual handling jobs, 
                                                 
1 MSDs are also referred to as cumulative trauma disorders or repetitive stress injuries. 
2 The terms rule and regulation are used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
3 Unless otherwise specified, references to MSDs and nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses refer to 
those that required injured employees to miss at least one day of work.  
4MSDs have remained approximately 34% of all nonfatal workplace injuries and illnesses since 1992.   
5 The American Heritage College Dictionary. 1997. Third Edition.  
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and jobs in workplaces for which at least one MSD has been reported.
6,7 It is not clear 
whether it covers home offices.
8 
The rule requires employers of workers in “high-risk” jobs, which include manual 
handling and manufacturing, to implement a “basic” ergonomics program before an 
employee experiences a MSD and a “full” program after one worker experiences a MSD. 
OSHA requires the full program, with the same single injury trigger, for employers of 
workers with other types of jobs covered by the rule.
9 OSHA’s basic ergonomics 
program requires the employer to report injuries and provide workers with information 
about MSDs.
10 The full program requires employers to eliminate or “materially reduce” 
the risk of MSDs using job controls and other measures.
11 The full program also requires 
employers to transfer injured workers to less risky activities at 100% of take-home pay, 
or to compensate workers for days away from work at 90% of pay if restricted work is 
not a viable option.
12 
                                                 
6The number of industries and establishments are from OSHA’s Table VIII-1 of industries by 3-digit SIC 
code. OSHA (1999a, p. 65987). The number of employees is from Table IV-2 of the RIA, representing 
those employees that are not already covered by an ergonomics program. OSHA (1999b).  
7 Such MSDs are termed “OSHA recordable” MSDs. These MSDs must meet one of the following criteria:  
a diagnosis by a certified health care provider, at least one positive physical finding, or a MSD symptom. 
The injury must be related to the physical tasks an employee performs and connected to the physical work 
activities at the core or significant part of the employee’s job. OSHA (1999a, p. 65777 and 65783).  
8 OSHA does not state in the proposed rule that it does not cover home offices. However, OSHA sent an 
advisory letter to CSC Credit Services on November 15, 1999, in response to an inquiry, stating that 
federal health and safety rules are applicable to home offices. A week later, OSHA published the 
ergonomics rule and on January 4, the Washington Post  reported on the new policy and its applicability to 
the new rule. OSHA publicly withdrew the letter on January 27, and released a statement on February 25 
clarifying that employers are not liable for the home offices of employees. The Washington Post (2000a) 
and The Washington Post (2000b). 
9 OSHA’s approach allows employers some flexibility. Employers can, for example, implement the “Quick 
Fix” option to reduce the risk of workplace MSDs, which allows employers 90 days to implement some 
controls to reduce risk instead of implementing the full program. They can also limit their efforts to the 
injured employee if they show that MSD hazards do not pose a problem for other employees in the same 
job. Employers can discontinue major parts of their ergonomics program if no MSDs are reported in a 
problem job within three years after the employer takes action to reduce the risk OSHA (1999a, p. 65792). 
10 Specifically, the firm must designate an ergonomics program manager, set up a MSD reporting system, 
and provide information to employees on MSD risk factors and symptoms. 
11 It requires employers to increase training, recordkeeping, program evaluation, and management efforts 
relative to the basic program. 
12 OSHA does not state explicitly that these benefits from the rule will be greater than the current level of 
benefits workers receive for MSDs, or if more injuries will be covered under the rule than at present. 
OSHA states only that “most cases requiring [worker restriction protection] will be covered by workers’ 
compensation.” OSHA (1999b, p. 23 of Chapter V). If the rule results in a significant increase in benefits 
and/or a broader definition of a MSD than the current definition, the incentive for workers to exaggerate or 
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OSHA estimates the proposed rule will cost $4 billion per year and generate $9 
billion per year in benefits. Yet, OSHA did not fully evaluate the nature and extent of 
MSDs in the workplace, or demonstrate why private markets are failing to significantly 
reduce the risk of workplace MSDs. OSHA further based its economic analysis on a 
series of unrealistic assumptions, and failed to test the sensitivity of its benefit and cost 
estimates to alternative assumptions.  
Before proceeding with the final regulation, OSHA should more precisely 
evaluate the nature and extent of MSDs than it did in the proposed rule and use this 
information to target serious MSDs that employers can reduce at low cost. To better 
target MSDs, OSHA must disaggregate information about MSDs by job type, industry, 
and injury and provide more information about the nature, severity, and cause of specific 
MSDs.
13 Direct OSHA regulation may not be warranted, even for serious MSDs, if 
alternative strategies can adequately address the alleged market failure, such as providing 
workers with more information.  
Section II describes a framework for good regulatory decision making, based on 
widely accepted economic principles. Sections III and IV show that OSHA could 
improve the ergonomics rule by using this framework. Section III shows that OSHA 
could improve the rule by more fully evaluating the nature and extent of workplace 
MSDs than it did in the proposed rule. Section IV shows that OSHA could use improved 
economic analysis to target serious MSDs that employers can reduce at low cost. Section 
V concludes that OSHA should address the concerns described in Sections III and IV 
before proceeding with the final regulation, and also should improve employer access to 
information about MSDs. 
 
II. A Framework for Regulatory Decision Making  
 
OSHA’s ergonomics rule does not sufficiently address two basic economic issues 
fundamental to good regulatory decision-making. These two issues, which all agencies 
                                                                                                                                                 
fake injuries increases. OSHA did not adequately address this issue in the proposed rule, but we do not 
pursue it further in this paper. 
13 OSHA states that the rule “focuses on jobs where problems are severe and solutions are well 
understood,”  but does not provide evidence to support this assertion. OSHA (1999a, p. 65787). 
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should address before regulating, are: first, whether the regulation addresses a 
"significant market failure"; and second, whether the regulatory intervention is likely to 
do more good than harm.
14 In spite of widespread recognition of the importance of these 
economic issues, agencies often ignore them.
15 Significant is not easily defined, but it 
generally means that the regulation could result in substantial improvements in economic 
efficiency.
16 In other words, the expected benefits of regulating far outweigh the expected 
costs.
17 Once an agency shows that a significant market failure exists, it should use 
economic analysis to show that the regulation will do more good than harm.  
Generally, market failures can arise if information asymmetries exist, if certain 
goods are not priced appropriately, or if there is a natural monopoly.
18 A significant 
market failure is a necessary condition for regulation, rather than just a market failure, for 
two reasons. First, market failures are pervasive in all economies, even smoothly running 
capitalist economies. Second, if the government attempted to correct small market 
failures, the intervention could do more harm than good because regulation often has 
unintended consequences.
19 Regulators must demonstrate that a significant market failure 
exists because otherwise they would have too much latitude to regulate. 
OSHA designed the ergonomics rule to address two sources of market failure: 
first, imperfect knowledge about workplace risk may prevent workers from demanding 
wages that fully compensate them for the risk of injury
20;
 second, flaws in the workers’ 
                                                 
14Regulators are familiar with these issues. President Clinton, for example, requires agencies to conduct an 
economic analysis of proposed regulations in Executive Order 12866, and describes twelve “Principles of 
Regulation.” The first principle states that “Each agency shall identify the problem that it intends to address 
(including, where applicable, the failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new agency 
action) as well as assess the significance of that problem." Clinton (1993). § 1(b)(1) of Executive Order 
12866. The sixth principle states that agencies “shall” show that the benefits of a regulation justify the 
costs. Clinton (1993). § 1(b)(6) of Executive Order 12866. 
15 See Hahn (1999a) and Hahn et al. (2000) for a discussion of agency failure to provide good analyses. 
16Economic efficiency is often defined as the sum of producer and consumer surplus.  
17In economist=s terms, the regulation should pass a broadly defined benefit-cost test. See, e.g., Crandall et 
al. (1997). A reasonable lower bound for passing a benefit-cost test might be $100 million to $1 billion in 
net benefits for major federal regulations.  
18 See, e.g., Bator (1958) and Akerlof (1970). 
19 See, e.g., Viscusi (1984).  
20 If employers and workers have perfect information about the risk of workplace MSDs, and workers 
accept a wage that compensates them for that risk, there is no market failure. Evidence suggests, however, 
that workers do not have perfect information about the risk of MSDs. Smith (1992) and Viscusi (1992), for 
example, provide evidence that workers slowly learn of workplace hazards after they have been on the job. 
On the other hand, labor markets could work reasonably well even if some workers are not well informed 
about risk. Poorly informed workers may be protected, in part, if some workers have good information 
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compensation system prevent employers from taking appropriate safety measures to 
reduce risk.
21  OSHA identifies these market failures in the economic impact analysis of 
the proposed rule, but does not provide empirical support for their existence – in part 
because such evidence is limited. OSHA uses a proxy for proof of a market failure, 
information about the number of MSDs in the workplace, which is justified by the dearth 
of information about the actual market failure. OSHA does not, however, fully evaluate 
the nature and the extent of MSDs in the workplace in the proposed rule or account for 
ongoing employer efforts to reduce MSDs. OSHA therefore does not demonstrate in the 
proposed rule that a significant market failure exists. 
OSHA could show that a significant market failure exists if OSHA more precisely 
evaluates the nature and extent of workplace MSDs than it did in the proposed rule, but 
the market failure is probably smaller than OSHA believes. If OSHA shows that the 
ergonomics rule addresses a significant market failure, then a second economic issue 
arises: whether the chosen regulatory intervention will do more good than harm. In the 
case of the ergonomics rule, OSHA can use economic techniques to show that the rule 
targets serious MSDs that employers can reduce at low cost.  
 
II.  The Nature and Extent of MSDs in the Workplace 
Given the difficulty of determining whether workers are fully compensated for 
workplace MSD risk, the existence of a market failure is legitimately controversial. 
OSHA does not precisely define a MSD, much less adequately account for employer 
                                                                                                                                                 
about wages and risks and employers cannot easily discriminate between workers. If this is the case, poorly 
informed workers will benefit from the higher wages demanded by the workers with more information.   
21The government-mandated workers’ compensation system exists because the labor market often fails to 
provide workers with the optimal level of safety and income protection against work-related injuries. 
Private markets could fail to provide such protection, for example, because of transaction costs associated 
with negotiation, and asymmetric information about workplace risks. The workers’ compensation system 
does not fully correct these market failures because it sometimes does not provide employers with perfect 
incentives to reduce workplace risk (Krueger, 1990a). The employer’s incentive to invest in risk reduction 
measures increases as workers’ compensation premiums increase. Workers’ compensation premiums are 
based on “experience ratings,” however, which are estimates of workplace risk based an employer’s history 
of recorded injuries. Experience rating is imperfect because injury rates have a random component to them 
and because often premiums are determined by averaging the risk across workplaces in an industry (Smith, 
1992 and Krueger,1990). The mechanism for determining the employer’s workers’ compensation 
premium, for example, frequently fails to reflect the real costs associated with an employer’s record of 
injuries. OSHA (1999b, p. 9 of  Chapter V). 
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efforts to reduce MSD or provide good information about the nature, severity, and cause 
of MSDs.  Consequently, OSHA has not yet demonstrated that the ergonomics rule will 
result in significant efficiency gains.
22  
 
Definition of Workplace MSDs 
 
Workplace MSDs are difficult to define because it is not always clear that an 
injury is the result of workplace activities involving repetitive motion. A sprained back, 
for example, could result from repetitive motion or from a single traumatic event. 
Furthermore, a MSD could result from exposure to multiple risk factors, such as different 
job tasks, non-work activities, and the physical ability of a worker to tolerate repetitive 
motion. The definition of a MSD is important because it affects estimates of workplace 
MSDs, which in turn affects the public’s perception of the problem. 
The different definitions of MSDs used by OSHA and BLS illustrate some of the 
problems in measuring the magnitude of the potential problem. MSDs are generally 
defined in the ergonomics literature as injuries that occur after prolonged exposure to 
workplace activities that involve repetitive or forceful exertion, static or awkward 
postures, and vibration.
23 They are associated in many cases with swelling along with 
other symptoms, such as numbness, restriction of motion, and loss of dexterity.
24 OSHA 
defines MSDs as injuries that develop as a result of repeated exposure to ergonomic risk 
factors.
25 OSHA’s definition includes injuries and disorders of soft tissues.
26 These 
injuries are characterized by sprains, strains, tears, back pain, soreness, or simply “pain,” 
as long as these injuries were caused by specified bodily motions, such as bending.
27 The 
BLS definition of a MSD, on the other hand, excludes injuries from sprains, strains, and 
tears and traumatic injuries to soft tissues.
28  
                                                 
22 The use of the number of MSDs as a proxy for the significance of the market failure is reasonable 
because information about worker compensation for workplace risk is limited. At the same time, these 
statistics should be interpreted carefully. 
23 Silverstein et al. (1997). According to the Silverstein et al. definition, MSDs primarily affect soft tissues.  
24 Sorock and Courtney (1996) 
25 OSHA (1999a, p. 65783). 
26 Soft tissues are muscles, nerves, tendons, ligaments, joints, cartilege, and spinal discs.
  
27OSHA’s definition covers a number of different injuries, but does not include single event accidents. 
28These soft tissues include tendons, ligaments, muscles, or joints. BLS includes arthropathies, 
dorsopathies, rheumatism, osteopathies, chondropathies, and acquired musculoskeletal deformities.  
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Figure 1 shows how the definition of a MSD affects estimates of the number of 
workplace MSDs. According to OSHA’s definition, the number of workplace MSDs in 
1997 was 626,000, or approximately 34% of all nonfatal occupational injuries and 
illnesses that required at least one day away from work. According to BLS, the number 
was 34,325, or 2% of all nonfatal injuries and illnesses.
29 Dudley and Rowen (1999) 
made a similar point about the definition of MSDs in its comment on OSHA’s draft 
ergonomics rule, released in 1995.
30 Mercatus estimated that the number of MSDs 
experienced in 1994 ranged from 332,000 to 705,800, depending on which BLS data 
categories were included in the estimate.
31,32 OSHA states that it chose to include specific 
BLS categories after it consulted with a panel consisting of an occupational physician 
and two professional ergonomists, but did not offer further support for its definition in 
the proposed rule.
33  
  There are additional problems with defining and identifying MSDs, which go 
beyond issues related to the data. MSDs are the result of a number of risk factors, such as 
non-work activities and the physical capacity of an individual to tolerate repetitive stress 
motion.
 34 OSHA acknowledges such risk factors, but does not explain how they could 
affect the number of workplace MSDs the regulation will reduce or its original estimate 
of the number of MSDs.
35 For example, OSHA writes that most non-work activities are 
not performed with the duration or intensity characteristic of occupational exposures and 
that the physical capacity of an individual to tolerate repetitive stress motion influences 
the risk of injury, yet does not provide empirical evidence of these effects.
 36  
                                                 
29Linda Garris, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, telephone interview by Tats 
Kanenari, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C., February 2000. 
30 Dudley and Rowen (1999). 
31 The estimate of 332,000 MSD is based on the number of repeated trauma illnesses while the 708,000 
estimate includes repeated motion and overexertion illnesses in addition to repeated trauma illnesses.  
32 The OSHA MSD estimate is based on a cross-tabulation of four BLS data categories: nature of injury 
(i.e. strain, sprains, and tears), body part affected (i.e. the back), source of injury (i.e. machine operation), 
and event or exposure (i.e. overexertion).  
33 See OSHA (1999a, p. 65928). 
34 Non-work activities associated with upper extremity musculoskeletal disorders, for example, include 
gender-based hormonal factors, chronic diseases, and poor repair or healing of previous acute trauma 
injuries. The wrist size/shape and the body mass index also can increase upper extremity MSD risk. 
35 OSHA (1999a, p. 65868). 
36 Sorock and Courtney (1996).  
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  OSHA’s estimate could also underestimate workplace MSDs. Studies have 
shown, for example, that workers often do not report MSDs. The extent of underreporting 
could be as high as 50%, according to OSHA, although this estimate is controversial.
37 
OSHA does not test this potential effect in the economic analysis of the proposed rule. 
 
Employer Efforts to Reduce MSDs 
 
While some markets may fail to fully compensate workers for the risk of MSDs, 
evidence also suggests that markets are adjusting in response to an increased 
understanding of workplace risk. The number of workplace MSDs has decreased by an 
average of 5% a year since 1992, both according to the BLS estimate and the OSHA 
estimate of MSDs.
38 Although the cause of the decline is not clear, some suggested 
explanations include reform of state worker’s compensation systems and risk reduction 
programs implemented by employers and insurance carriers.
39 Furthermore, it could be 
the result of improved information about the frequency of MSDs.  BLS changed its data 
collection practices in 1992, for example, in part to provide better information about 
MSDs. The emergence of new data contributed to heightened awareness of the problem, 
which OSHA acknowledges.
40 OSHA efforts to reduce MSDs prior to the proposed rule, 
through inspections and enforcement of the General Duty clause, may also have 
contributed to the decline.
41 OSHA does not evaluate the extent to which the private 
                                                 
37 OSHA summarizes studies that attempt to estimate the extent of underreporting of occupational injuries 
and illnesses. The studies are not specific to MSDs, and the extent of estimated underreporting ranges from 
approximately 9% to 45%. OSHA does not critically evaluate these studies, or provide evidence that they 
are representative of all industries, so the true extent to which MSDs are underreported is unclear. OSHA 
(1999a, p.65980-65893).  
38 The estimate of the decline in all workplace MSDs could, however, conceal problems in specific 
industries or job types.  
39 Murphy and Volinn (1999).  
40 See OSHA (1999b, p. 4 of Chapter VIII). 
41 OSHA has been using the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, as 
well as other means, to reduce MSD risk since the mid-1980s. OSHA reached a corporate-wide agreement 
with the meatpacking industry regarding repetitive stress injuries in the late 1980s and early 1990s, for 
example, and a corporate-wide agreement with General Motors in 1990. Courtney and Maynard (1999) 
write that OSHA inspections of workplaces with a high risk of MSDs peaked in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and have since declined, perhaps in anticipation of an ergonomics rule.  
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sector will continue to reduce MSDs without further government intervention, and 
therefore overestimates the number of MSDs the proposed regulation will reduce.
42 
 
The Nature, Severity, and Causes of MSDs 
    
Knowledge about the nature, severity, and causes of workplace MSDs is essential 
to the design of cost-effective ergonomics programs. Without such knowledge, 
companies could invest heavily in safety measures that produce negligible benefits. 
Alternatively, carefully targeted safety expenditures could reduce injuries and perhaps 
result in increases in worker morale and productivity. To illustrate the importance of 
understanding the nature, severity, and cause of MSDs, we analyzed data provided by the 
BLS that OSHA used to estimate the number of workplace MSDs. We found that OSHA 
probably included injuries in its MSD estimate which are not MSDs and that the causes 
of some MSDs are poorly understood. OSHA should use information about the nature, 
severity, and causes of MSDs to redesign the proposed regulation to target MSDs that are 
severe and well understood, and which employers can reduce at low cost.
43 
  Nature. A significant number of injuries covered by the rule are not injuries 
typically recognized as MSDs. The popular press and OSHA focus on high-profile 
injuries like carpal tunnel syndrome when they discuss repetitive stress injuries. Yet, 
Table 1 shows that 65% of MSDs are “sprains, strains, and tears” from overexertion and 
only 5% are carpal tunnel syndrome caused by repetition, according to OSHA’s 
definition of a MSD.
44 OSHA did not explain its decision to include sprains, strains, and 
tears from overexertion in its estimate of MSDs. OSHA states instead that it relied on the 
recommendations of its expert panel of ergonomists.   
Table 2 shows that approximately 55% of MSDs are back injuries, using OSHA’s 
definition.
45 Injuries affecting the trunk, excluding the back, are the next most prevalent 
                                                 
42 All nonfatal injuries and illnesses have also been falling since 1992, at approximately the same rate, 
however, so it is not clear the employers have made special efforts to reduce MSDs. 
43 OSHA has focused efforts to reduce MSDs in the automobile and meatpacking industries in the past, and 
plans to release separate ergonomics rules for other high-risk industries agriculture, construction, and 
maritime operations. 
44 We also analyzed data from 1992-1996, but the percentages did not change significantly in any year. 
45 Other authors’ findings support this conclusion. Daltroy et al. (1997) write that low back pain accounts 
for 15% to 25% of the injuries covered by workers’ compensation and accounts for 30% to 40% of 
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type of injury, followed by upper extremity injuries. If some of these back injuries are not 
caused by repetitive motion resulting from workplace activities, the rule should not cover 
them. Furthermore, a review of the literature on interventions to reduce back pain reveals 
that they are sometimes ineffective, in part because the causes of back injuries are often 
difficult to identify and in part because rest or restricted work activity is sometimes the 
most effective remedy.
46 OSHA did not show that the causes of back injuries are well 
enough understood to design effective ergonomics programs, or that back injuries can be 
traced to workplace activities.  
  Most back injuries are sprains, strains, or tears.
47 At least some of the injuries 
included in the sprains, strains, and tears category are probably not MSDs, both because 
they are back injuries or because of the nature of the injury. The BLS defines sprains, 
strains, and tears as “traumatic injuries to muscles, tendons, joints, and ligaments.”
48 In 
addition, sprains are generally defined as injuries resulting from a painful wrenching of a 
ligament or joint – not necessarily repetitive motion.
49 Strains, on the other hand, are 
generally considered the result of overuse or overexertion. Overexertion, according to the 
BLS, is excessive physical effort involving lifting, pulling, and other similar actions – 
repetitive motion is not mentioned in the definition.
50 The BLS further specifies to 
employers filling out its survey that all diseases and disorders affecting the 
musculoskeletal system should be included in the separate category for MSDs, not in the 
sprains, strains, and tears category. OSHA did not show that all the injuries in the sprains, 
strains, and tears category are MSDs, yet OSHA uses this MSD estimate to calculate the 
number of injuries the rule will reduce.  
                                                                                                                                                 
workers’ compensation payments. The significance of back injuries as a percentage of total injuries may be 
decreasing, however. Murphy and Volinn (1999) estimate that workers’ compensation payments for low 
back pain decreased from 36% of total payments in 1987 to 23% in 1995.   
46 See Daltroy (1997). 
47 Author’s calculation based on BLS data. Daltroy et al. (1997) supports this finding, stating that 87% of 
back injuries are sprains, strains, and tears, and 72% of those are from overexertion.   
48 Definition from the BLS Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 1992-1997. A standard 
dictionary definition of “trauma” is “serious injury or shock to the body, as from violence or an accident” 
or “injury (as a wound) to living tissue by an extrinsic agent.” American Heritage College Dictionary 
(1997) and Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977), respectively. 
49 American Heritage College Dictionary (1997). Third Edition. 
50 The definition of “bodily reaction” is “bending, climbing, crawling, reaching, or twisting.” Definitions 
from the BLS Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 1992-1997.  
  13 
Severity. In the absence of detailed information on the cost-effectiveness of 
interventions, OSHA’s proposed rule should consider targeting the most severe injuries 
because they also are the most costly. Such injuries require more long-term medical 
attention than less severe injuries, and require workers to take more time off work to 
recover.
51 While severity is difficult to define, OSHA could at least focus the ergonomics 
rule on those injuries that require workers to miss many days of work to recover. OSHA 
does not make any distinction between injuries based on severity, however, although 
OSHA emphasizes the consequences of severe injuries in its proposed rule.
52 OSHA’s 
annual MSD estimate includes injuries that require from one day to one year away from 
work. The regulation therefore could cover some injuries that are not severe enough to 
justify government intervention in the workplace.  
Causes. The causes of many MSDs are poorly understood, often because there 
are multiple risk factors.
53 Understanding the causes of a MSD is essential to the design 
of an effective ergonomics program to reduce the risk of injury, and is therefore central to 
OSHA’s proposed rule.
54 OSHA recognizes the uncertainty associated with causation, 
and devotes seventy pages of the Federal Register notice to an exhaustive review of the 
results from hundreds of causation studies. OSHA concludes that the weight of the 
evidence presented in the Federal Register notice indicates a causal relationship between 
workplace risk factors and work-related musculoskeletal disorders.
55  While some studies 
demonstrate a causal relationship for some injuries and job types, however, they are 
usually specific to individual workplaces and injuries.  
The causes of some MSD injuries are better understood than other MSD injuries. 
Demands of different jobs place various types of stress on a worker, and such stress is 
more easily evaluated and reduced in some jobs than others. Low back disorders, for 
                                                 
51 In a study of U.S. workers’ compensation claims for low back injuries, Hashemi et al. found that 12.4% 
of claims with a “length of disability” greater than three months accounted for 87.9% of the costs. 
52 OSHA states that workers with severe MSDs can face permanent disability that prevents them from 
returning to their jobs or handling simple, everyday tasks like combing their hair, picking up a baby, or 
pushing a shopping cart. OSHA (1999a, p. 65769).  
53 See Volinn (1999) for an analysis of whether workplace interventions prevent low-back disorders. 
54 Case studies of other injuries support the assertion that understanding the cause of the injury is essential 
to the design of effective programs. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health did a study of 
data entry staff at US West and found that, despite a reported increase in the number of MSDs in the years 
preceding the study, almost all workstations were of high ergonomic quality. Scalia (1994). 
55 See OSHA (1999a, p. 65926). 
  14 
example, are the most prominent type of MSD according to OSHA’s definition. 
Abenhaim et al. (1995) and Deyo (1997) found that a definite diagnosis may be assigned 
to only a small minority of all low back disorder cases. Nachemson (1994) find that in 
80-90% of low back disorder cases the true cause of the pain is unknown. Regarding 
upper extremity musculoskeletal disorders, Sorock and Courtney (1996) report that 
“Despite the substantial body of work, there has been relatively little progress towards a 
better scientific understanding of exposure-disease associations.” The cause of some 
injuries, on the other hand, is more easily identified. Employers could, for example, 
reduce low back disorders among automobile assembly workers with a well-designed 
ergonomics program if research demonstrates a specific relationship between a specific 
automobile assembly task and the risk of injury.
56  
The lack of a clear understanding of the cause of some MSDs is primarily the 
result of multiple risk factors.
57 Sorock and Courtney assert, for example, that the lack of 
progress in understanding the cause of musculoskeletal upper extremity disorders is in 
part the result of poor study design and the inability to isolate individual risk factors. 
Even OSHA writes that a clear determination of whether these multiple risk factors act 
additively or synergistically within the workplace is not yet feasible.
58 Yet OSHA states 
that to be covered by the rule, a MSD must be “a OSHA-recordable injury,” “directly 
related to the employee’s job,” and “specifically connected to activities that form the core 
or a significant part of the worker’s job.”
59 The lack of a clear causal relationship for 
many workplace MSDs will make it difficult to both determine whether the injury is 
directly related to the employee’s job and to design effective ergonomics program to 
reduce risk. 
 
IV. Use Improved Economic Analysis to Identify Target MSDs 
 
If OSHA determines that a significant market failure exists after a more careful 
evaluation of the nature and extent of MSDs in the workplace than the evaluation 
                                                 
56 Punnett et al. (1991) 
57 Possible exceptions include some vibration-related disorders (i.e. low back pain from truck driving or 
operating construction equipment) and heavy lifting (i.e. injuries from frequent lifting of hospital patients). 
58 See OSHA (1999a, p. 65866). 
59 http://www.osha.gov/ergonomics-standard/fs-over.html 
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provided in the proposed rule, OSHA should use improved economic analysis to target 
serious MSDs that employers can reduce at low cost. OSHA should use the following 




  In its cost analysis, OSHA relied on information from a limited sample of experts 
and on assumptions that overestimate cost savings and underestimate the costs of 
ergonomics program implementation. OSHA also did not test the sensitivity of its final 
estimates to uncertain parameters in its analysis. OSHA estimates that the rule will cost 
$3.4 billion annually over a ten-year period, and an additional $.8 billion annually if the 
costs of additional work restriction provisions are included.
60 The costs include workers 
compensation benefits and the costs of the ergonomics programs. Approximately 54% of 
the total costs are related to implementation of ergonomics programs to reduce MSD 
risks. OSHA’s cost estimate is low because OSHA overestimates likely labor savings and 
underestimates the cost of implementing ergonomics programs to reduce risk. 
   Labor Cost Savings from Increases in Productivity. OSHA overestimated the 
percentage increase in productivity resulting from interventions, which leads to 
significant labor cost savings according to OSHA’s calculations.
61 OSHA created 170 
scenarios of different workplace interventions designed to reduce workplace MSD risk, 
based on case studies, the ergonomics literature, and the expert opinion of one 
professional ergonomist.
62 
  For each scenario, OSHA calculated the cost of the 
intervention and the labor savings, if such savings exist, resulting from increased 
productivity. OSHA based its labor savings estimate on the wage rate, the hours per year 
the worker performed the task, and an estimated percentage increase in productivity. 
OSHA did not show that the case studies it used are reliable and representative of typical 
                                                 
60 The $.8 billion is a transfer of costs from employees to employers.  
61OSHA claims that many ergonomic interventions improve productivity, either because they reduce 
employee fatigue and relieve muscle pain or because they involve automating portions of jobs in ways that 
can be expected to improve productivity.  See OSHA (1999a, p. 66010).   
62 OSHA developed the 170 scenarios with the help of a consulting firm, Auburn Engineers. The scenarios 
are based on published case studies and the experience of professional ergonomists. Each of the scenarios 
describes the industry, occupational group, job, reason the MSD arising from the job is covered by the 
regulation, physical work activities or work conditions, risk factors, and applied ergonomic controls.  
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ergonomic interventions, however. Reports of the success of ergonomics programs could 
be biased, for example, if the person reporting is responsible for implementation of the 
program. Also, OSHA could have overestimated labor cost savings if it relied primarily 
on case studies of voluntary programs rather than required programs because employers 
who have the most to gain from implementing ergonomics programs are more likely to 
implement them voluntarily.  
OSHA further did not explain why, for 67 of the 170 scenarios, its estimate of 
labor savings from the intervention is greater than its estimate of the costs.
63 After 
calculating the labor savings for each of the 170 scenarios, OSHA subtracted the labor 
savings from the costs of the intervention to estimate the net costs of the intervention. Of 
the 170 scenarios, 96 did not result in productivity increases. Of the 74 scenarios that did 
result in productivity increases, 67 resulted in labor savings greater than the costs of the 
intervention. OSHA also did not explain why employers do not currently take advantage 
of the availability of such significant savings.  
Costs of Ergonomics Programs. OSHA’s calculation of the costs of the 
proposed rule is sufficiently convoluted that it is difficult to determine whether OSHA 
underestimated or overestimated the costs to modify jobs that cause MSDs. OSHA used 
average estimates of costs and labor savings from high cost, high technology 
interventions to estimate a cost ratio for each of 26 occupational groups.
64 To arrive at its 
estimate of the average cost of interventions for each of the 26 groups, OSHA multiplied 
the ratio for each group by the cost of interventions estimated by three ergonomics 
consultants.
65 The consultant estimates of the costs are based on low cost, low technology 
                                                 
63 In one scenario, for example, the gross cost of reducing MSD risk per worker is $417 and the resulting 
labor savings are $127,534 per worker. 
64 The ratio is total costs minus labor cost savings resulting from increases in productivity (termed net costs 
by OSHA) divided by total costs (termed gross costs by OSHA), and represents the percentage of totals 
costs that are actual costs after accounting for labor cost savings. 
65The discussion in the text skips over some of the details of OSHA’s calculation to simplify the discussion 
for the reader. OSHA estimated intervention costs for 170 scenarios and subtracted labor savings. OSHA 
then used these cost estimates to calculate a ratio of average net costs to average gross costs, as described 
in the text, averaged the ratios from the 170 scenarios for 26 occupational groups, and asked the three 
consulting ergonomists to estimate the average costs of interventions for the 26 groups. OSHA then 
multiplied its ratios for the 26 occupational groups by the average cost for each group estimated by the 
consultants. The resulting cost estimates are presented in the proposed rule. On a related note, OSHA also 
did not explain why it chose the three ergonomists to estimate the costs, or explain the substantial variation 
between some of the estimates from different ergonomists for interventions in different occupational 
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interventions, which the consultants insist are standard workplace interventions.
66 More 
information is necessary to determine the nature of the bias in OSHA’s calculations.
67    
Finally, OSHA estimates that employers can reduce MSD risk for 85% of all 
problem jobs without hiring outside experts.
68 This estimate is based on information 
provided by a single ergonomics consultant. OSHA did not, however, provide evidence 
that the information provided by a single consultant is sufficient to validate the 85% 
estimate, and did not test the sensitivity of the assumption. OSHA did not explain why 
1,500 hours per year is a valid estimate of the number of hours per year the task is 
performed for approximately 1/3 of the scenarios for which no estimate was provided.
69 
Given that 2,000 hours a year is a 40-hour, 50-week work year, this estimate assumes that 
the worker performed the same task almost all day. Since many workers are responsible 




OSHA overestimated the benefits of the rule to employers, and did not estimate 
the benefits of the rule to workers. OSHA estimates that the rule will reduce workplace 
                                                                                                                                                 
groups. The estimates varied from $190 to $900 in the “administrative support except clerical” 
occupational category, for example. 
66These consultants were originally asked to develop cost estimates for OSHA’s 170 scenarios. They 
refused in part because they thought OSHA interventions were not representative of standard interventions, 
and that costs estimates based on the scenarios would overestimate true costs. Instead, they developed 
average cost estimates for 26 occupational groups based on low cost, low technology interventions that 
they thought represented standard workplace interventions. OSHA used these estimates in their final cost 
calculation, explained further in footnote 64. See OSHA (1999b, p. 16 of Chapter V). 
67 OSHA’s approach would tend to overestimate the savings from labor and overestimate the overall cost 
of interventions. The impact of the ratio OSHA uses to adjust the cost estimates of the ergonomists is 
ambiguous without further information. For example, OSHA assumed that the ratio of average net costs to 
average gross costs for high cost, high technology interventions is representative of the ratio of average net 
costs to average gross costs for low cost, low technology interventions. If these ratios are not equal, OSHA 
probably underestimated the costs. 
68 OSHA estimates that 50% of problem jobs can be fixed by someone with very little ergonomics training, 
and the other 35% will require a trained ergonomics program manager. 
69 According to OSHA, the 1,500 hours assumption is based on the average number of hours worked by 
employees in the other 2/3 of the scenarios. 
70 OSHA further assumes that the cost of evaluating job controls is the same in all industries, for all job 
types. Given that some industries have higher MSD risks than other industries and that the cause of some 
injuries is better understood than others, this assumption is not defensible. In addition, OSHA assumes that 
the MSD risk factors are identifiable and are work-related. As is clear from the discussion in the previous 
section on the cause of MSDs, this is not always the case. 
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MSDs by 26% relative to 1996 levels over a ten-year period. The decline in workplace 
injuries could both reduce worker pain and suffering and reduce the cost of medical, 
insurance, and worker compensation costs to employers and society. OSHA does not 
estimate a value for reduced worker pain and suffering.
71 OSHA does, however, estimate 
that the rule will save employers and the rest of society $9 billion a year in injury-related 
costs.
72 While it is clear from an evaluation of OSHA’s economic analysis of the rule that 
it overestimated employer benefits, the rule may still have significant worker benefits in 
terms of reduced pain and suffering. Given that OSHA did not provide a clear description 
of workplace MSDs, as described earlier in this paper, the potential magnitude of these 
benefits is unclear.  
OSHA overestimated the benefits of the rule to employers because it based its 
estimate on five flawed assumptions: 1) that the programs implemented as a result of the 
rule will reduce workplace risk by 50%; 2) that programs to reduce risk are equally 
effective, regardless of injury or industry; 3) that the studies it used to estimate the 
benefits of the rule are comparable to the studies; 4) that the rule does not provide 
workers with the incentive to exaggerate or fake injuries; and 5) that the MSD rate will 
stay at 1996 levels for the ten-year duration of OSHA’s economic analysis.
73 OSHA also 
did not test the sensitivity of its final estimates to uncertain parameters in its analysis. 
Effectiveness of Ergonomics Programs. OSHA overestimates the average 
effectiveness of ergonomics programs, which overestimates the number of injuries 
OSHA expects the rule to reduce. OSHA assumes that ergonomics programs required by 
the rule will reduce workplace risk by 50%, and estimates the number of injuries the 
proposed regulation will reduce based on this assumption. The ergonomics literature 
suggests that there is serious debate about the effectiveness of various interventions to 
                                                 
71Viscusi (1992), however, provides a widely accepted estimate for the value of an averted injury. Viscusi 
reviewed all existing labor market studies on the cost of a workplace injury, and determined that the value 
is between $25,000 and $50,000 per injury.  
72 OSHA estimates that employers pay more than $15 to $20 billion in workers’ compensation costs each 
year for MSDs, and other associated expenses may increase this total to $45 to $54 billion a year. See 
OSHA (1999a, p. 65769). 
73 OSHA overestimated benefits only if workers are reporting the majority of workplace MSDs. If 
underreporting of MSDs is a significant problem, as OSHA suggests, then OSHA should recalculate the 
benefits of the rule to reflect the extent of estimated underreporting. As discussed earlier in this paper, 
however, OSHA did provide a defensible analysis of the extent of underreporting in its description of the 
proposed rule. 
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reduce MSD risk, however, and OSHA’s does not provide sufficient support for its 
assumption in the proposed rule.
74  
  OSHA bases its 50% effectiveness assumption on two separate reviews of 
intervention studies, neither of which provides sufficient evidence to justify OSHA’s 
50% assumption. OSHA cites the highest estimates of program effectiveness for different 
injuries from the first review, and ignores the low estimates of program effectiveness.
75 
The high estimates are based on the assumption that programs reduce 100% of workplace 
MSD risk, which is doubtful given evidence that ergonomics programs are sometimes 
ineffective or fail to reduce all risk.
76 The low estimates of program effectiveness assume 
that the programs reduce only half of the risk of MSDs from workplace activities, 
perhaps a more plausible assumption. The low estimates of program effectiveness range 
from 38% to 47%, which suggests that OSHA’s assumption of 50% effectiveness is not 
conservative, as OSHA claims.
77 
The second review of intervention effectiveness is based the studies in high-risk 
industries, which introduces selection bias.
78 Programs in these industries may be more 
effective because the injuries are more frequent, severe, and well understood.
79 
Approximately 29% (30) of the studies are conducted in the twenty-one industries with 
the highest MSD incidence rates (greater than 600 MSDs per 10,000 workers), for 
example, yet these same high-risk industries represent only 6% of the 342 industries 
covered by the proposed rule.
80 OSHA also did not include any studies of ergonomics 
                                                 
74Volinn (1999), for example, writes that both the media and the ergonomics literature express dissenting 
views about whether interventions to reduce the risk of a low-back disorder are effective. He cites a 
number of studies on both sides of the debate. 
75 The first review, conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, summarizes 
the results of 600 studies. The results of this review are discussed and presented in a summary table. 
76 See, e.g. Daltroy (1997). 
77 OSHA (1999b, p. 5-6 of Chapter IV). 
78 The second review, conducted by OSHA, summarizes the results of 104 studies. Each of the 104 studies 
is described in a table in the Federal Register notice of the proposed rule. 
79 According to BLS, nine industries, each having at least 100,000 injuries, accounted for about 1.7 million 
injuries, or 30% of the 5.7 million total injuries that resulted in lost worktime, medical treatment other than 
first aid, loss of consciousness, restriction of work or motion, or transfer to another job in 1997. See 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999).  
80 Only 22% of the studies OSHA reviewed are in industries with less than 300 MSDs, yet 65% of the 
industries covered by the proposed rule have MSD incidence rates less than 300 MSDs per 10,000 
workers. Approximately 46% (48) studies are conducted in the 101 industries with less than 600 MSDs per 
10,000 workers but more than 300 MSDs. Eighteen of the thirty studies are in the automobile industry, 
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programs for which there was no observed effect in this review.
81 Finally, the review 
contains a number of studies that were not peer-reviewed, and OSHA did not provide 
evidence that results of the studies are robust.
82  
  Program Effectiveness Varies. Ergonomics program effectiveness is dependent 
on the type of injury and the nature of the industry, if not the specific job. OSHA did not 
show that the 50% effectiveness estimate applies to all MSDs, industries, and jobs. Even 
a cursory review of the ergonomics literature reveals that there are significant differences 
in the effectiveness of ergonomics programs between industries, as well as between 
programs designed to reduce different types of injuries. It is therefore inappropriate to 
apply one effectiveness estimate to all ergonomics programs. 
   Link Between Cost and Benefit Estimates. OSHA does not link the studies it 
used to estimate the benefits of the proposed rule to the costs of the rule. It reviewed over 
100 studies as part of its benefits analysis, yet provides no evidence of costs based on 
these studies. The cost of achieving the level of risk reduction that OSHA estimates will 
result from the rule is therefore unclear. As discussed in the previous section, OSHA 
analyzed the costs of ergonomics programs by averaging estimates from three consultants 
for 26 different occupations. OSHA does not, however, describe whether the programs on 
which the consultants based their estimates are comparable to the programs on which 
OSHA based its estimates of the effectiveness of ergonomics program. 
  Incentive to Exaggerate or Fake Injuries. The rule could provide workers with 
an incentive to take more days off work, exaggerate the nature of their injury, or file 
                                                                                                                                                 
which has a MSD incidence rate of 1,221 MSDs per 10,000 workers. Industries with less than 300 MSDs 
per 10,000 workers account for 73% of employees in all establishments, relative to 22% for industries with 
between 300 and 600 MSDs per 10,000 workers, and 5% for industries with over 600 MSDs per 10,000 
workers. OSHA (1999a, Table VIII-1) and OSHA (1999a,  p. 65986).  
81 See, e.g. Daltroy et al. (1997). This recent New England Journal of Medicine study showed, for example, 
that educational programs to reduce back injuries among postal workers sometimes have no effect. 
82 A number of the studies OSHA reviewed came from news sources that appear to rely on information 
provided by ergonomics program managers for estimates of the effectiveness of the ergonomics programs. 
These managers have the incentive to overestimate the effectiveness of the program because it is a measure 
of their personal success on the job. Furthermore, many of these programs, in addition to programs 
reported in the literature, are programs that companies adopted voluntarily and therefore may be more 
effective than required programs. OSHA also relied on some peer-reviewed studies with results that have 
been challenged elsewhere. OSHA included a study by Garg and Owen (1992), for example, that Volinn 
(1999) challenged in the ergonomics literature because it did not include a contemporaneous control group 
and did not randomize study subjects. Garg and Owen (1992) conducted a study of the effectiveness of 
patient handling devices nursing home workers. They found the reportable back injury rate declined 43%. 
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more fraudulent claims than they would in the absence of the rule. The rule provides 
workers diagnosed with a MSD with compensation at 90% of after tax wages and 100% 
compensation for restricted work. These benefits represent an unspecified increase in 
benefits relative to current benefits from workers’ compensation programs. OSHA does 
not adequately address the impact the increase in benefits may have on the number and 
duration of claims, referred to as moral hazard.
83 OSHA further does not address why 
employers should compensate workers more for MSD injuries than for other workplace 
injuries, such as burns, broken limbs, or sprains.  
  Validity of Assuming Continuous 1996 MSD Rate. OSHA uses its 1996 
estimate of workplace MSDs as the baseline for its analysis of the number of MSDs the 
proposed rule will reduce over a ten-year period. It assumes that MSDs will remain at 
this level. OSHA does not factor in the observed 5% annual decline in MSDs since 1992, 
discussed earlier in this paper. If OSHA factors some portion of this decline into its 
analysis, it would result in a lower estimate of the injuries reduced as a result of the rule. 
This would lower estimates of the costs of the rule as well as the benefits, although it will 
reduce the cost estimate more than the benefit estimate. 
 
V. Improve Worker and Employer Access to Information about MSDs 
 
OSHA should generate better information about the nature, severity, and causes 
of MSDs.  It and can use this information to target serious MSDs that employers can 
reduce at low cost. OSHA also should provide information to workers and employers 
about risk, intervention costs, intervention effectiveness, and the causes of specific 
MSDs. Improved access to information will allow workers, as well as employers, to take 
action to reduce the risk of injury. A worker, for example, could switch jobs or make 
lifestyle changes, such as an increasing exercise. If employer savings from ergonomics 
programs that OSHA cites in the proposed rule exist, such as increased worker 
                                                 
83 Increases in the number of claims and duration of claims as a result of an increase in benefits is well-
documented. See Krueger (1990a), Krueger (1990b), Viscusi (1992), and Butler and Worrall (1991). To 
date, however, scholars have not been able to disassociate what part of the increase is a result of legitimate 
injuries that workers chose not to report, and what part is due to the effect of moral hazard. As a result, 
experts suggest that the empirical evidence now available is not sufficiently precise to determine how the 
response of workers will affect economic efficiency. See Viscusi (1992) and Krueger (1990a). 
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productivity and worker compensation savings, improving employer access to useful 
information about the rewards and effectiveness of such programs should encourage 
employers to adopt them. 
OSHA should provide on-line information about MSDs and fill in key 
information gaps in the literature. While information on ergonomics programs is 
available, there is no central, reliable on-line source of information about ergonomics 
programs. OSHA should provide information specific to job types, industries, and 
injuries, as well as evaluate the quality of the research findings. If necessary, OSHA 
could commission studies to fill in key information gaps, such as practical information 
about program effectiveness by job type or information about the cause of back injuries 
by industry. 
The number of MSDs in the workplace is declining without the ergonomics rule, 
and OSHA must carefully weigh the benefits and costs of government intervention to 
reduce risk. OSHA could play a useful role in providing information, and possibly 
targeting efforts to reduce serious MSDs that employers can reduce at low cost. Unless 
OSHA effectively addresses some of the more serious flaws in the proposed rule, 
however, OSHA should not proceed with the final regulation.  
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